Online Appendix:
Politicians' Private Sector Jobs And Parliamentary Behavior

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Contents

A Cross-National Regulation

In the Introduction, I reference cross-sectional regulation of moonlighting and corporate campaign donations. For the former, data is for 2010 and comes from Djankov et al. (2010). A country is considered to ban private sector jobs if it prohibit MPs from being members of boards of directors, officers (CEO, CFO), and advisors in companies. Only 20 percent of democracies do so, where a country is considered democratic if it has a Polity IV score of 6 or higher. Figure A1 shows which countries permit and prohibit moonlighting. Data for campaign finance regulation is for 2017/18 and comes from IDEA (2018). 34.5 percent of democracies ban corporate donations to candidates, and 36.5 percent prohibit corporate contributions to parties.



Figure A1: Regulation on Whether MPs are Allowed to Hold Private Sector Employment While in Office (2010). Gray: Democracies that prohibit MPs from being members of boards of directors, officers (CEO, CFO), and advisors in companies (18 countries). Black: Democracies that allow MPs at least one of these three roles (72 countries). White: Not a democracy (Polity IV score lower than 6) or no data. Source: Djankov et al. (2010).

B Background Information on Moonlighting Regulation and Register Data

Members of the House of Commons are allowed to earn money in the private sector while they are in office. The Code of Conduct of the House of Commons does not prescribe limitations on the kinds of employment that MPs can engage in or what their salary can be, other than that members should not act as paid advocates for their employers.[1] MPs who are members of the government (ministers, ministers of state, parliamentary secretaries) are also subject to the Ministerial Code of Conduct, which states that "[w]hen they take up office, Ministers should give up any other public appointment they may hold."[2] Thus, government members are not permitted to earn money in the private sector, and can only do so after leaving it. All other MPs can have outside jobs during and after holding a post.

[1] https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmcode/1076/1076.pdf.
[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministerial-code.

MPs are required to disclose any earnings within 28 days to the *Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards*.[3] The registration threshold is £100 for individual payments, or £300 for the total of multiple payments from the same source in a calendar year. A failure to declare income can trigger an investigation by the Committee on Standards, and serious cases can be punished by up to two years in prison.[4] The entries are disclosed in the *Register of Members' Financial Interests*, which is made available online.[5]

There are several challenges to make the information provided in the register amenable to quantitative analysis. First, the register is updated every two weeks while parliament is in session, and less frequently otherwise. All entries remain on file for one year. This means that with every update, there are deletions and additions. The latter are not highlighted in an easily identifiable way. In addition, MPs also often update their entries, for example if their salary or workload changes. The website www.theyworkforyou.com, which is run by the non-profit organization *mySociety*, tracks additions and deletions to the register.[6] While the changes contain false positives (e.g. font changes), this website makes it much easier to keep track of MPs' private sector incomes, thus reducing the potential of errors.

The Register of Members' Financial Interests: Part 1
As at 2nd June 2014

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RIFKIND, Rt Hon Sir Malcolm (Kensington)

1. Remunerated directorships

Continental Farmers Group plc (non-executive), 33 Athol St, Douglas Isle of Man; farming in Eastern Europe. Approximately 6 board meetings per year, each lasting around 4 hours. Occasional ad hoc meetings. Travel time to Douglas or Dublin to be added.

Monthly ongoing payment of £4,580 gross, July 2011 *(Registered 12 July 2011)*

Discontinued July 2013. Last payment received 15 July 2013. *(Updated 24 July 2013)*

Adam Smith International (including Amphion Group Ltd and Adam Smith Services Ltd) (non-executive), 3 Albert Embankment, London; consultancy and project implementation overseas.

Monthly ongoing payment of £2,916.66 gross. *(Registered 8 September 2009)*

One-off payment of £3,500, received 31 May 2013. *(Registered 7 June 2013)*

Figure A2: Example Entry from the *Register of Members' Financial Interests*. Part of the entry for Sir Malcolm Rifkind from June 2, 2014.

Second, and more significantly, the registry entries do not follow a standardized format. Figure A2 shows part of the register for Sir Malcolm Rifkind from June 2014. He reports monthly ongoing payments as well as one-off earnings, and other MPs follow a similar practice. This makes an automated extraction impossible. Therefore, trained research assistants and I manually coded all entries for all MPs. We employed frequent cross-checks to minimize coding errors.

[3] https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-financial-interests/parliamentary-commissioner-for-standards/registers-of-interests/register-of-members-financial-interests/.

[4] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-hunt-latest-probe-launch-luxury-flats-purchase-labour-health-secretary-investigation-a8310621.html.

[5] https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-financial-interests/parliamentary-commissioner-for-standards/registers-of-interests/register-of-members-financial-interests.

[6] For an example see https://www.theyworkforyou.com/regmem/?p=10001.

C Additional Information on Data

C.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the main results specifications.

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics. For variables used in main regressions.

All	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Vote Rebellion	0.008	0.016	0.000	0.215
Vote Participation	0.736	0.158	0.000	0.993
Parliamentary Question (log)	2.823	1.844	0.000	7.223
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.207	0.405	0.000	1.000
Minister	0.055	0.228	0.000	1.000
Minister of State	0.043	0.202	0.000	1.000
Parliamentary Secretary	0.058	0.234	0.000	1.000
Frontbench Team	0.103	0.304	0.000	1.000
Shadow Cabinet	0.203	0.402	0.000	1.000
Committee Chair	0.074	0.262	0.000	1.000
Committee Member	0.640	0.480	0.000	1.000
Enter Office	0.091	0.287	0.000	1.000
Leave Office	0.043	0.202	0.000	1.000
Conservative				
Vote Rebellion	0.010	0.020	0.000	0.215
Vote Participation	0.803	0.133	0.000	0.993
Parliamentary Question (log)	2.293	1.764	0.000	6.833
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.302	0.459	0.000	1.000
Minister	0.093	0.291	0.000	1.000
Minister of State	0.065	0.246	0.000	1.000
Parliamentary Secretary	0.103	0.304	0.000	1.000
Frontbench Team	0.076	0.265	0.000	1.000
Shadow Cabinet	0.041	0.198	0.000	1.000
Committee Chair	0.077	0.267	0.000	1.000
Committee Member	0.639	0.481	0.000	1.000
Enter Office	0.100	0.300	0.000	1.000
Leave Office	0.023	0.150	0.000	1.000
Labour				
Vote Rebellion	0.004	0.008	0.000	0.062
Vote Participation	0.687	0.140	0.000	0.982
Parliamentary Question (log)	3.489	1.682	0.000	7.223
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.110	0.313	0.000	1.000
Minister	0.010	0.100	0.000	1.000
Minister of State	0.011	0.105	0.000	1.000
Parliamentary Secretary	0.008	0.089	0.000	1.000
Frontbench Team	0.038	0.192	0.000	1.000
Shadow Cabinet	0.442	0.497	0.000	1.000
Committee Chair	0.082	0.275	0.000	1.000
Committee Member	0.636	0.481	0.000	1.000
Enter Office	0.071	0.257	0.000	1.000
Leave Office	0.051	0.219	0.000	1.000

C.2 Types of Employment

Figure A3 breaks earnings down by type of employment. Panel (a) shows that most money MPs earn comes from "regular" employment, in which MPs receive a salary for occupying a specified position. Income from press and publication activities (newspaper columns, TV appearances, books) and from speeches was lower. Panel (b) plots the share of MPs who report annual earnings and shows that regular employment was also the most common type of second job, followed by press appearances and speeches. Finally, Panel (c) reveals that average earnings are also the highest for MPs with a regular job.



(a) Total Private Sector Earnings **(b)** Share of MPs with Private Sector Earnings≥£1000 **(c)** Mean Earnings of MPs with Jobs

Figure A3: Private Sector Earnings by Types of Employment. Dashed vertical lines indicate election years.

C.3 Comparing MPs With and Without Moonlighting Jobs

Table A2 descriptively compares MPs who do hold jobs and those who do not. Among others, the former are more likely to be male and Oxbridge-educated, more likely to have held committee chair positions, have been in office longer, and represent constituencies closer to London.

C.4 Additional Details on Industry Coding

In Figure 1(e) in the article, I show the breakdown of MPs employment spells into industries, which I have summarized into eight broader categories. I did so as follows:

- **Health**: Health Care, Medicine
- **Finance**: Finance, Banking
- **Consulting**: Consulting
- **Knowledge, for-profit**: Publishing, Education (for-profit), Law Firm
- **Knowledge, not-for-profit**: Think Tank, Education (not-for-profit), Charity, NGO
- **Goods**: Energy, Mining, Oil and Gas, Manufacturing, Automotive, Transportation, Logistics, Agriculture, Food, Real Estate, Construction, Infrastructure
- **Services**: Software, IT, Telecommunications, Retail, Services, Leisure, Insurance
- **Other**: Public Agency, Defense, Foreign Government, Other

Table A2: Comparing MPs With and Without Moonlighting Jobs. Comparing characteristics of MPs that earn £1,000 or more in at least one year during the period of observation to MPs that never earn £1,000 or more between 2010 and 1016.

All	MPs with Jobs	MPs without Jobs
Minister	0.073	0.044
Minister of State	0.063	0.030
Parliamentary Secretary	0.070	0.051
Frontbench Team	0.089	0.111
Shadow Cabinet	0.150	0.236
Committee Chair	0.103	0.056
Committee Member	0.585	0.674
Years in Office	12.385	9.262
Constituency Distance to London	169.814	248.121
Female	0.165	0.303
Oxbridge	0.333	0.200
No University	0.115	0.207
Conservative		
Minister	0.088	0.099
Minister of State	0.075	0.054
Parliamentary Secretary	0.099	0.108
Frontbench Team	0.055	0.100
Shadow Cabinet	0.044	0.038
Committee Chair	0.118	0.032
Committee Member	0.628	0.650
Years in Office	11.562	6.724
Constituency Distance to London	132.625	149.144
Female	0.113	0.244
Oxbridge	0.373	0.282
No University	0.122	0.165
Labour		
Minister	0.029	0.004
Minister of State	0.013	0.010
Parliamentary Secretary	0.004	0.009
Frontbench Team	0.045	0.036
Shadow Cabinet	0.467	0.435
Committee Chair	0.074	0.085
Committee Member	0.461	0.691
Years in Office	14.362	11.487
Constituency Distance to London	192.843	276.122
Female	0.315	0.377
Oxbridge	0.270	0.146
No University	0.099	0.235

C.5 List of Companies in For-Profit Knowledge and Finance Industries

In the article, I show that the increase in the number of parliamentary questions asked is especially large among Conservative MPs who work in the for-profit knowledge and the financial sectors. The list of employers in each is provided below. It becomes clear that employers in the for-profit knowledge industry are mostly law firms, and that employers in the finance industry are mostly smaller asset management and investment advice companies.

For-Profit Knowledge:

- Allpay Limited
- Barlow Robbins Solicitors

- Bendles
- Blackburns Solicitors
- Blake Morgan LLP
- Blake Turner & Co
- Cains Advocates Limited
- Classwatch Limited
- Clyde & Co LL
- Coles Miller LLP
- Conyers, Dill & Pearman
- David W Harris & Co Solicitors
- DLA Piper LLP
- Edexcel plc
- Evans Derry
- Fiona Bruce & Co LLP
- Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP
- GC Solicitors
- Grants Solicitors LLP
- Greenwoods Solicitors
- Group Legal Counsel, Time Group Computers Ltd
- Harcus Sinclair
- Harvey & Wells Solicitors
- Higher Education Strategy Board of TES Global
- Hill Dickinson LLP
- Hinkhouse Williams Walsh LLP
- Holman Fenwick Willan LLP
- Just Learning Holdings Ltd
- Kaim Todner Solicitors
- Kennedys
- Lester Dominic Solicitors
- McMillan Williams Solicitors
- Messrs Knowles Benning & Co
- Messrs. Aegis Tax LLP
- Messrs. Dellapina Law
- Messrs. Janes, solicitors
- Messrs. Matthew Arnold & Baldwin LLP, solicitors
- Messrs. McGrigors

- Messrs. Paul Martin & Co
- Messrs. Royds LLP
- MFB
- Military Courts Services LLP
- More Fisher Brown LLP
- New Law Centre
- Nicholas Woolf and Co. Solicitors
- Paris Smith LLP
- Penningtons, solicitors
- Probation Service
- Reed Smith LLP
- RMPI LLP Solicitors
- Rothera Dowson Solicitors
- Royds Solicitors
- Sach Solicitors
- Saunders Law Partnership
- Seymours
- Shepherd Harris and Co
- Simmons & Simmons LLP
- Solicitors: Pinsent Masons LLP
- Solicitors: Arlingtons Sharmas
- Solicitors: Foot Anstey LLP
- Solicitors: Messrs Hassans
- Squire, Sanders & Dempsey (UK) LLP/Squire Patton Boggs (UK) LLP
- Symons & Gay LLP Solicitors
- Tennant & Knight Solicitors
- TES Global
- The House Magazine
- The Khan Partnership, solicitors
- Thomas Boyd Whyte Solicitors
- Thomas Cooper
- Timagenis Law Firm
- Travers Smith
- Weightmans LLP
- Wikborg Rein LLP
- William Cash & Co

- Woodlands Schools Ltd
- Zaiwalla & Co., Solicitors

Finance:

- Allpay Limited
- Apex Fund Services Holdings
- Baronsmead VCT-4-PLC
- Beak Kemmenoe
- Bondholder Communications Group
- Caxton Europe Asset Management Ltd
- CNU Online Holdings LLC
- Consolidated Asset Management Holdings Plc
- Consumer Credit Association of the United Kingdom
- County Finance Group Ltd
- Curve Capital Venture
- Eden Group Ltd
- Emerging Asset Management Ltd
- EPIC Private Equity
- Europe Arab Bank
- Evercore Pan-Asset Capital Management Ltd
- FIL Investment Management Ltd
- First London Securities Group plc
- Intrepid Capital Partners
- Investec
- J. Stern & Co. LLP
- Kamal Exchange Company LLC
- Knight Frank Investment Management LLP
- Markit Group Ltd
- Melchior Japan Investment Trust
- Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation
- Newtons Investment Management
- Oakley Capital Limited
- Odey Asset Management
- Palmer Capital Partners Ltd
- Pegasus Capital Advisors LP
- Pembroke VCT plc
- Philip T English International Financial Services Ltd

- PLLG Investors Advisors Ltd
- Ras Al Khaimah Development LLC
- Severn Capital LLP
- Social Investment Business
- Somerset Capital Management LLP
- Taha & Partners Ltd
- Technology Investments Group of Investcorp International
- The CCA
- Tullett Prebon Plc
- Werner Capital LLP
- Wilcocks & Associates Ltd
- YiMei Capital

C.6 Additional Details on Content of Parliamentary Questions

Tables A3 and A4 provide details the content of 16,794 written parliamentary questions asked by Conservative MPs to the two ministries that saw the largest increases as a consequence of moonlighting (6,031 questions to the transportation ministry and 10,763 questions to the health ministry). Questions can fit into multiple categories, so shares do not add up to 1.

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics, Content of Parliamentary Questions, Transportation.

Type	Share
Internal Policy Question	0.559
Factual Information Request	0.325
Question Urging Action	0.099
Question about Timing	0.052

Table A4: Descriptive Statistics, Content of Parliamentary Questions, Health.

Type	Share
Internal Policy Question	0.629
Factual Information Request	0.334
Question Urging Action	0.117
Question about Timing	0.046

D Additional Analyses

D.1 Cross-Sectional Relation between Moonlighting and Parliamentary Behavior

Table A5 compares the mean values for the three dependent variables of MPs that earn £1,000 or more in at least one year during the period of observation to MPs that never earn £1,000 or more. Conservative MPs who hold a job at some point are, descriptively, *less* likely to participate in roll call votes. The same holds true for Labour MPs. In contrast, Conservative MPs who moonlight submit *more* parliamentary questions, even descriptively. There is no difference for Labour MPs.

Table A5: Cross-Sectional Relation between Moonlighting and Parliamentary Behavior. Comparing mean values of characteristics of MPs that earn £1,000 or more in at least one year during the period of observation to MPs that never earn £1,000 or more between 2010 and 2016.

All	MPs with Jobs	MPs without Jobs
Vote Rebellion	0.009	0.007
Vote Participation	0.731	0.739
log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)	2.659	2.926
Conservative		
Vote Rebellion	0.011	0.010
Vote Participation	0.781	0.829
log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)	2.401	2.174
Labour		
Vote Rebellion	0.004	0.004
Vote Participation	0.657	0.696
log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)	3.485	3.490

Table A6 shows the results from estimating Equation (1) in the article, but without the MP fixed effects. This mirrors the cross-sectional research designs that most existing studies on moonlighting use. Focusing on Conservative MPs only, the coefficient for vote rebellion is close to zero, the one for vote participation is negative, and the one for parliamentary questions is positive. This highlights the importance of focusing on within-MP variation to identify how moonlighting affects parliamentary behavior. While MPs who moonlight are less likely to attend votes overall, they are *more* likely to attend them during times when they hold private sector jobs compared to times when they do not. The sign of the coefficient for parliamentary questions is the same in both specifications, but the effect is much larger when focusing on within-MP variation (0.455 vs. 0.235).

Table A6: Effect of Private Sector Employment on Parliamentary Behavior. Similar specification as Equation (1) in article, except without MP fixed effects.

	DV: Vote Rebellion (Share)			**DV: Vote Participation (Share)**			**DV: log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)**		
	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.001	−0.002	0.0005	0.004	−0.023***	−0.020	0.058	0.235**	−0.213
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.095)	(0.111)	(0.222)
Observations	4,691	2,214	1,861	4,691	2,214	1,861	4,714	2,219	1,874

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions include year fixed effects and a set of controls (entered parliament, left parliament, minister, minister of state, parliamentary secretary, shadow cabinet, frontbench team, committee chair, committee member. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the MP-level.

D.2 Impact of Different Types of Employment

Table A7 shows results from a specification in which the indicator for earnings of £1,000 or more is replaced with three separate binary variables that capture whether an MP earned £1,000 or more

through regular employment, press contributions, and speeches, respectively (see Figure A3). The overall positive effects on vote participation and parliamentary questions shown in the article are overwhelmingly driven by regular employment.

Table A7: Effect of Different Types of Private Sector Employment on Parliamentary Behavior.

	DV: Vote Rebellion (Share)			DV: Vote Participation (Share)			DV: log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)		
	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000, Regular Employment	0.001	0.002	−0.000	0.023**	0.026**	0.004	0.341***	0.436***	0.013
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.100)	(0.115)	(0.193)
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000, Press	0.001	0.002	0.001	−0.003	0.014	−0.017*	0.272**	0.357**	−0.018
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.106)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000, Speeches	0.001	0.001	0.001**	0.013	0.008	0.010	0.243**	0.157	0.226
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.096)	(0.133)	(0.156)
Observations	4,691	2,214	1,861	4,691	2,214	1,861	4,714	2,219	1,874

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions include MP and year fixed effects and a set of controls (entered parliament, left parliament, minister, minister of state, parliamentary secretary, shadow cabinet, frontbench team, committee chair, committee member. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the MP-level.

D.3 Additional Analyses of Impact of Moonlighting on Vote Participation

D.3.1 Effect of Moonlighting by Vote Importance

Figure 2(a) in the article shows that when Conservative MPs in the highest distance tercile have a moonlighting job, they are about 5.6 percentage points more likely to attend a vote. I show that this can be attributed to them spending more time in London, which makes it easier to be present in parliament.

However, it is unlikely that this effect is the same for all votes. Some votes are considered very important by the party leaderships and are thus heavily whipped, whereas others are not. For bills subject to the so-called three-line whip, MPs are required to attend, unless exceptional circumstances (e.g. hospitalization) prevent them from doing so. It is unlikely that MPs would not attend such votes if they had no moonlighting job. On the other end of the spectrum, bills considered least important are only subject to a one-line whip, in which attendance is not required.

Unfortunately, what category a bill falls into is not public. However, the lower the attendance, the less likely it was subject to stringent party discipline. I therefore calculate attendance for each bill among Conservative MPs who do *not* have a private sector job, so as not to create an endogenous proxy. I then estimate a series of regressions as in Equation (1) of the paper, where the dependent variable is computed only for votes where attendance exceeds a threshold a. As a increases, the estimated effect comes more and more from votes that are whipped.

Figure A4 shows the results. The first line on the left replicates the point estimate and 95 percent confidence interval of the effect of moonlighting using all votes. Moving to the right, I only use bills in which a steadily increasing share of non-moonlighting Conservative MPs attended. The effect remains very stable. However, once attendance reaches around 80 percent, the impact of moonlighting starts to diminish and eventually becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, once we only look at bills that have a high attendance rate among non-moonlighting MPs (and are thus likely to be subject to stricter whipping), having a private sector job does not affect the attendance of MPs whose constituencies are far away from London. This indicates that the increase in participation is for votes that are less important.

D.3.2 Simulation of Effect of Abstention Change on Vote Outcomes

The fact that MPs are more likely to attend votes when they hold private sector jobs raises the question of whether moonlighting affects the outcomes of parliamentary votes. Here, I simulate



Figure A4: Effect of Private Sector Employment on Vote Attendance, Conditional on Party Discipline for Conservative MPs in Highest Distance Tercile Point estimate and 95 percent confidence interval for effect of moonlighting job on vote participation, using only votes in which participation among Conservative MPs without a private sector job is more than the cutoff value on the horizontal axis.

the outcomes of all divisions for a counterfactual scenario in which no Conservative MP holds any private sector job.

I provide two simulations. First, I take each division and, for each Conservative MP who moonlights, I remove their vote with a probability of 2.8 percent, which is the effect of moonlighting on attendance estimated in Table 1 of the article. Second, I use the distance tercile-specific probabilities shown in Figure 2(a) of the article. In both scenarios, I simulate 1,000 counterfactuals for each division.

The first column in the first panel of Table A8 shows that this shifts the outcome margin by an average of 1.9 votes. Since the median vote margin by which a bill is passed or defeated is 81 votes over the period of observation, this has little effect on whether a bill passes or not: Only two bills have a non-zero probability of having a different outcome.[7] None of them have a chance of greater than 20 percent of flipping. The first column of the second panel shows similar effects when using distance-specific probabilities.

These simulations assume that moonlighting MPs are equally likely to miss each vote in the counterfactual scenario where they do not work in the private sector. But, as Figure A4 has shown, this is of course not true. The second column therefore repeats the simulations, but excluding the 25 percent of divisions with the highest attendance rates among Conservative MPs.[8] In these 1,303 divisions, the vote margin shifts by an average of 2.3 votes, resulting in two to three bills with at least some probability of having a different outcome. When using only the half of the divisions

[7]That is, only two bills had at least one simulation in which the outcome changed.

[8]I adjust the probability of missing a vote accordingly, so e.g. 2.8 percent become 2.8/0.75=3.7 percent.

Table A8: Simulation: Effect of Change in Vote Participation due to Moonlighting on Parliamentary Vote Outcomes.

Uniform Impact	All	Lowest 75%	Lowest 50%	Lowest 25%	Lowest 10%
Number of Divisions	1732	1303	887	438	173
Avg. Vote Shift	1.9	2.3	2.9	3.7	2.4
Different Outcome with p>0%	1	2	4	5	5
Different Outcome with p>20%	0	0	0	1	3
Distance-Specific Impact	All	Lowest 75%	Lowest 50%	Lowest 25%	Lowest 10%
Number of Divisions	1732	1303	887	438	173
Avg. Vote Shift	1.9	2.3	3.0	3.7	2.4
Different Outcome with p>0%	1	3	2	4	5
Different Outcome with p>20%	0	0	0	1	4

with lower attendance, the shift increases to 2.9–3.0 votes, and for the lowest quarter it becomes 3.7 votes. In the latter case, five divisions have a potentially different outcome, one of them with a probability of more than 20 percent. Finally, when only taking the 10 percent of divisions with the lowest attendance, five have a non-zero chance of a different outcome, and three–four of them have a chance of greater than 20 percent.

D.4 Addressees of Questions by Directors and Employees in Finance and For-Profit Knowledge Industries

Figure 4 in the article shows variation in the number of questions asked to different addressees when MPs moonlight. Figure A5 shows the same focusing only on those who become directors and those who work in the finance and for-profit knowledge industries. Figure A6 shows the bivariate correlations between the effects from Figure A5 and ministerial characteristics (procurement spending, number of major projects, operating budget, number of employees). Overall, we see a similar order of ministries, and similar positive correlations of the effects with ministerial characteristics, as when examining all jobs together.



(a) Job Title: Director



(b) Industry: Finance



(c) Industry: Knowledge, for-profit

Figure A5: Effect of Private Sector Employment on (Logged) Number of Parliamentary Questions by Directors and Employees in Finance and for-profit Knowledge Industries to Different Ministries. Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals. Separate regressions for each ministry. Regressions include MP and year fixed effects and a set of controls. Standard errors clustered at the MP-level. The numbers provide the differences between two adjacent coefficients (*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01).



(a) Job Title: Director: Procurement Spending **(b)** Job Title: Director: Number of Major Projects **(c)** Job Title: Director: Operating Budget **(d)** Job Title: Director: Number of Employees



(e) Industry: Finance: Procurement Spending **(f)** Industry: Finance: Number of Major Projects **(g)** Industry: Finance: Operating Budget **(h)** Industry: Finance: Number of Employees



(i) Industry: Knowledge, for-profit: Procurement Spending **(j)** Industry: Knowledge, for-profit: Number of Major Projects **(k)** Industry: Knowledge, for-profit: Operating Budget **(l)** Industry: Knowledge, for-profit: Number of Employees

Figure A6: Bivariate Correlations between Ministry Characteristics and Effect Size of Private Sector Employment on (Logged) Number of Parliamentary Questions Asked by Directors and Employees in Finance and for-profit Knowledge Industries, Conservative MPs.

D.5 Question Content by Ministry

Figure 5 in the article shows the effect of holding a moonlighting job on different types of questions to the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Health combined. Figure A7 shows the estimates for both ministries separately. The basic pattern is the same.



(a) Ministry of Transport **(b)** Ministry of Health

Figure A7: Effect of Private Sector Employment on Content of Parliamentary Questions to Transport and Health Ministry by Conservative MPs. Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals.

D.6 Topics of Questions by Directors and Employees in Finance and For-Profit Knowledge Industries

Figure 5 in the article shows that moonlighting MPs mostly increase the number of questions that ask about internal policy. Figure A8 shows the same focusing only on those who become directors and those who work in the finance and for-profit knowledge industries. It becomes clear that the increase among all three groups is also most pronounced for internal policy questions and factual information requests.

D.7 Prior Connections to Future Employers

I conducted extensive internet searches on all 242 regular employment spells by Conservative MPs that started after 2010 and began at least one year into their parliamentary career, and looked for previous links between the MP and the company. For example, this could be documented meetings between the MP and the company, previous employment spells in the same company or in companies with the same founder or owner, or previous political donations. Overall, I was able to find prior connections going back at least one calendar year for before the employment start date for 36 percent of the spells.

Panels (a) and (b) in Figure A9 show that there are large differences by job titles and industries. In particular, it shows that company directors (the only job title that showed significant pre-trends



(a) Job Title: Director **(b)** Industry: Finance **(c)** Industry: Knowledge, for-profit

Figure A8: Effect of Private Sector Employment on Content of Parliamentary Questions to Transport and Health Ministry by Conservative MPs: Directors and Employees in Finance and for-profit Knowledge Industries. Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals.

in Figure 8) were the most likely to have prior connections to their employers. Panel (b) shows that MPs in the goods industry, who also exhibited lead effects, have an above-average rate of prior connections as well. Finally, Panel (c) shows that the two industries that exhibited significant pre-trends (goods and consulting) have among the greatest shares of MPs working in director positions. Taken together, this suggests that the pre-trend in questions observed in Figure 7 is driven by directors, who are most likely to have prior connections with their future employer.



(a) Share with Previous Connections: Job Titles **(b)** Share with Previous Connections: Industries **(c)** Share of Company Directors: Industries

Figure A9: Documented Prior Connection between MP and Employer Panels (a) and (b): Share of employment spells with documented previous connections, by job title and industry, Conservative MPs. Dashed line: Mean share of employment spells with documented prior connection (0.36). Panel (c): Share of MP employment spells as company directors, by industry, Conservative MPs. Dashed line: Mean share of employment spells as company directors (0.28).

E Robustness Checks

E.1 Alternative Thresholds for Dependent Variable

In the article, I use an earnings cutoff of £1,000 for the main independent variable. Figure A10 replicates the main results from Table 1 using alternative thresholds between £0 and £5,000. Comparing the original coefficients (red) to those using the alternative thresholds, there are not many differences. In particular, the positive effects on vote participation and parliamentary questions among Conservative MPs are robust throughout.

E.2 Including Controls for Post-Position

Table 1 in the article includes time-variant controls for MPs holding certain parliamentary positions. Weschle (2021) shows that MPs see a large increase in moonlighting income *after* leaving a ministerial position. Table A9 estimates models including a set of post-position dummies as controls. The results are similar to those in Table 1 of the article using this alternative approach.

Table A9: Robustness Check: Including Controls for Post-Position. Models from Table 1 in the article.

	Vote Rebellion (Share)			Vote Participation (Share)			log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)		
	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.001*	0.001	0.001	0.020**	0.025**	0.008	0.391***	0.489***	0.025
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.080)	(0.100)	(0.134)
Observations	4,691	2,214	1,861	4,691	2,214	1,861	4,714	2,219	1,874

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions include MP and year fixed effects and a set of controls (entered parliament, left parliament, minister, minister of state, parliamentary secretary, shadow cabinet, frontbench team, committee chair, committee member, post-minister, post-minister of state, post-parliamentary secretary, post-shadow cabinet, post-frontbench team, post-committee chair, post-committee member). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the MP-level.

E.3 Alternative Rebellion Dependent Variable

The rebellion variable used in Table 1 of the manuscript is MPs' share of rebellious votes out of *all* votes. In Table A10, I instead use a dependent variable that is the share of rebellious votes out of all *attended* votes. The estimated effects are similar, although with somewhat larger standard errors.

Table A10: Robustness Check: Share of Rebellious Votes out of Attended Votes.

	Vote Rebellion (Share of Attended)		
	All	Conservative	Labour
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.002*	0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	4,661	2,209	1,846

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions include MP and year fixed effects and a set of controls (entered parliament, left parliament, minister, minister of state, parliamentary secretary, shadow cabinet, frontbench team, committee chair, committee member, post-minister, post-minister of state, post-parliamentary secretary, post-shadow cabinet, post-frontbench team, post-committee chair, post-committee member). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the MP-level.



(a) Vote Rebellion, All **(b)** Vote Rebellion, Conservative **(c)** Vote Rebellion, Labour

(d) Vote Participation, All **(e)** Vote Participation, Conservative **(f)** Vote Participation, Labour

(g) Parliamentary Questions, All **(h)** Parliamentary Questions, Conservative **(i)** Parliamentary Questions, Labour

Figure A10: Robustness Check: Alternative Thresholds for Dependent Variable. Models from Table 1 in the article. Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals. All regressions include MP and year fixed effects and a set of controls. Standard errors clustered at the MP-level.

E.4 Excluding MPs Who Never Hold a Private Sector Job

In Table 1 of the article, I include data from all MPs, no matter whether they ever held a private sector job or not. Thus, the control group includes never treated individuals, who may not be comparable to MPs who do hold jobs. In Table A11, I instead only include MPs who at some point between 2010 and 2016 held a private sector job, so the control group is those who are not yet treated or no longer treated. The estimates for Conservative MPs are of similar magnitude than those in Table 1 of the article. Because Labour are less likely to hold a private sector job, the number of observations in those models drops dramatically. The point estimates for vote rebellion and participation nevertheless remain very similar. For parliamentary questions, the point estimate turns negative, but remains substantively and statistically insignificant.

Table A11: Robustness Check: Exluding MPs Who Never Hold a Private Sector Job. Models from Table 1 in the article.

	Vote Rebellion (Share)			Vote Participation (Share)			log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)		
	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.019**	0.027***	0.006	0.358***	0.414***	−0.026
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.078)	(0.097)	(0.131)
Observations	1,801	1,160	441	1,801	1,160	441	1,815	1,165	445

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions include MP and year fixed effects and a set of controls (entered parliament, left parliament, minister, minister of state, parliamentary secretary, shadow cabinet, frontbench team, committee chair, committee member, post-minister, post-minister of state, post-parliamentary secretary, post-shadow cabinet, post-frontbench team, post-committee chair, post-committee member). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the MP-level.

E.5 Main Results with Event Study Specification

The main results in the article are estimated using a two-way fixed effects specification. Here, I show all main results in the paper hold when using the more flexible specification from Equation (2). Figure A11 shows all models from Table 1. In all cases where there is a significant positive effect in Table 1, there also is a clear increase from two years prior to when holding the job. Figures A12 to A16 then replicate Figures 2 to 6 from the article using the specification from Equation (2), so including variables that capture the behavior of moonlighting MPs before and after holding a job. Again, the results are very similar to the one's from the two-way fixed effects specification.



(a) Vote Rebellion, All



(b) Vote Rebellion, Conservative



(c) Vote Rebellion, Labour



(d) Vote Participation, All



(e) Vote Participation, Conservative



(f) Vote Participation, Labour



(g) Parliamentary Questions, All



(h) Parliamentary Questions, Conservative



(i) Parliamentary Questions, Labour

Figure A11: Robustness Check: Event Study Specification for Results from Article Table 1. Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals. The numbers provide the differences between two adjacent coefficients (*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01).



(a) Effect of Moonlighting on Vote Attendance, by Constituency Distance to London (Separate Regressions)

(b) Effect of Moonlighting Job on Probability of Claiming London Allowance, by Constituency Distance to London (Separate Regressions)

Figure A12: Robustness Check: Event Study Specification for Results from Article Figure 2. Coefficients show effect of currently holding a job, coefficients for years before and after being in job not shown here.



(a) Job Titles

(b) Industries

Figure A13: Robustness Check: Event Study Specification for Results from Article Figure 3. Coefficients show effect of currently holding a job, coefficients for years before and after being in job not shown here.



Figure A14: Robustness Check: Event Study Specification for Results from Article Figure 4. Coefficients show effect of currently holding a job, coefficients for years before and after being in job not shown here.



(a) Procurement Spending **(b)** Number of Major Projects **(c)** Operating Budget **(d)** Number of Employees

Figure A15: Robustness Check: Event Study Specification for Results from Article Figure 5. Coefficients show effect of currently holding a job, coefficients for years before and after being in job not shown here.



Figure A16: Robustness Check: Event Study Specification for Results from Article Figure 6. Coefficients show effect of currently holding a job, coefficients for years before and after being in job not shown here.

E.6 Alternative DiD Estimator: Imai and Kim

Imai and Kim (2021) propose a weighted fixed effects estimator for difference-in-differences designs in which there are more than two periods and units switch in and out of treatment at different points. Table A12 shows that the results are similar to those in Table 1 of the article using this alternative approach.

Table A12: Robustness Check: Imai and Kim (2021) Approach. Models from Table 1 in the article.

	Vote Rebellion (Share)			Vote Participation (Share)			log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)		
	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.001*	0.002	0.002	0.020***	0.025***	0.013	0.173*	0.265**	0.040
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.089)	(0.126)	(0.158)
Observations	4,691	2,214	1,861	4,691	2,214	1,861	4,714	2,219	1,874

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions include a set of controls (entered parliament, left parliament, minister, minister of state, parliamentary secretary, shadow cabinet, frontbench team, committee chair, committee member). Standard errors in parentheses are cluster-robust allowing for arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.

E.7 Alternative DiD Estimator: Callaway and Sant'Anna

Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) suggest an alternative to the two-way fixed effects estimator when there are more than two periods and units switch into treatment at different points. Here, I show results using their approach. However, it is important to mention that by assumption, units who join the treatment group remain treated forever. This is of course not the case here, and e.g. Figure A11 shows that MPs also change their parliamentary behavior upon leaving private sector jobs. This means that the approach likely underestimates the treatment effect.

Table A13 shows the overall ATTs for the main models, which are quite similar to the effects estimated in Table 1 of the article. For vote rebellions, the effect is positive and significant for Conservative MPs, and the point estimate is in fact larger than in the two-way fixed effects model. The effect on vote participation for Conservatives is positive, but its magnitude is somewhat smaller and not statistically significant. Note, however, that Figure A11 shows a clear drop in vote participation when Conservative MPs leave office, and those periods are (incorrectly) included as treated by assumption. Finally, there again is a positive and significant effect on the logged number of parliamentary questions for Conservatives. Again, the estimated effects for Labour MPs are substantively small and indistinguishable from zero.

Table A13: Robustness Check: Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) Approach, Overall ATT. Models from Table 1 in the article.

	Vote Rebellion (Share)			Vote Participation (Share)			log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)		
	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.002	0.004**	-0.001	0.022*	0.017	0.007	0.133	0.386**	0.020
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.148)	(0.188)	(0.234)
Observations	710	286	300	710	286	300	710	286	300

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Doubly robust estimation method. Control Group: Not Yet Treated, Anticipation Periods: 0

Figure A17 shows the dynamic effects when entering a job. Again, note that this is only one of the two sources of variation in the main independent variable, as it ignores the effect of leaving a job on parliamentary behavior. In general, the changes from one year prior to the year of assuming the job are somewhat less pronounced than the changes from one year prior to taking a job to when

holding one in Figure A11. This is not surprising, as the latter specification aggregates across all years of holding a job. Also note that the similar approach proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) shows larger changes in behavior upon taking a job (see next section).



(a) Vote Rebellion, All **(b)** Vote Rebellion, Conservative **(c)** Vote Rebellion, Labour

(d) Vote Participation, All **(e)** Vote Participation, Conservative **(f)** Vote Participation, Labour

(g) Parliamentary Questions, All **(h)** Parliamentary Questions, Conservative **(i)** Parliamentary Questions, Labour

Figure A17: Robustness Check: Callaway and Sant'Anna (forthcoming) Approach, Dynamic Effects. Doubly robust estimation method. Control Group: Not Yet Treated, Anticipation Periods: 0.

Finally, Table A14 shows the overall ATT for the main models when allowing for a one year anticipation period. There are positive effects among Conservative MPs for all three dependent variables, and their magnitude is considerably larger than when not allowing for anticipation. Overall, then, the results using the approach by Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) are similar to those using the models in Equations (1) and (2) in the article.

Table A14: Robustness Check: Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) Approach, Overall ATT with One-Year Anticipation. Models from Table 1 in the article.

	Vote Rebellion (Share)			Vote Participation (Share)			log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)		
	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.003	0.006***	0.001	0.058***	0.058**	0.016	0.880***	1.404***	-0.271
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.229)	(0.272)	(0.384)
Observations	667	260	287	667	260	287	667	260	287

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Doubly robust estimation method. Control Group: Not Yet Treated, Anticipation Periods: 1

E.8 Alternative DiD Estimator: Sun and Abraham

Sun and Abraham (2021) propose another alternative to the two-way fixed effects estimator when there are more than two periods and units switch into treatment at different points. Just like Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), their approach assumes that once units become treated they remain so indefinitely. This is not the case here, so again results are likely to be underestimates.

Table A15 shows the overall ATT for the main models. They are again broadly in line with those presented in Table 1 of the article: When holding a job, Conservative MPs are more likely to cast rebellious votes and ask more questions. The effect on vote participation is also positive, but smaller in magnitude than the one in Table 1. However, note again that Figure A11 shows a clear drop in vote participation when Conservative MPs leave office, and those periods are (incorrectly) included as treated by assumption. Finally, there are no significant effects on Labour MPs.

Table A15: Robustness Check: Sun and Abraham (2021) Approach, Overall ATT. Models from Table 1 in the article.

	Vote Rebellion (Share)			Vote Participation (Share)			log(Number Parliamentary Questions+1)		
	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour	All	Conservative	Labour
Private Sector Income $\geq$ £1000	0.002	0.003**	-0.001	0.016	0.014	0.001	0.167	0.334**	0.035
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.01)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.135)	(0.159)	(0.216)
Observations	4,690	2,213	1,860	4,690	2,213	1,860	4,713	2,218	1,873

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Figure A18 shows the dynamic treatment effects of entering a private sector job. Again, this only considers one of the two sources of variation in the treatment variable. Conservative MPs exhibit no pre-treatment trends for vote rebellion and participation, as the coefficients for two years prior to holding a job are not significantly different from zero (the period one year prior to taking a job serves as the benchmark and is set to zero). In contrast, both coefficients for the year of taking up the job are positive and significant. For parliamentary questions, there is a pre-trend (the coefficient for two years prior is negative and significant) as well as an increase upon taking a job (the coefficient for the year of starting the job is positive and significant). This is again in line with the findings in the article.



(a) Vote Rebellion, All

(b) Vote Rebellion, Conservative

(c) Vote Rebellion, Labour



(d) Vote Participation, All



(e) Vote Participation, Conservative



(f) Vote Participation, Labour



(g) Parliamentary Questions, All



(h) Parliamentary Questions, Conservative



(i) Parliamentary Questions, Labour

Figure A18: Robustness Check: Sun and Abraham (forthcoming) Approach, Dynamic Effects.

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